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COMMENTS
UNION MEMBERSHIP: PRIVILEGE OR RIGHT?
KEITH M. CALLOW*
HISTORICAL TRENDS
T HE RAPID GROWTH of the labor union movement in the past sixty
years has created many new, unique and complex problems. The
application of old concepts and theories to these problems often has
resulted in illogical and inequitable answers. In certain branches of
labor law the courts have been slow in providing workable rules due to
their adherence, not only to the old concepts, but also to-as if they
applied to the present situation-the reasoning behind the old con-
cepts. Some problems are being misread. Union membership must
come to be recognized as a right and not a mere privilege. The courts
should take cognizance of the complete scope of the problem and pro-
ceed on the premise that the union exists for the worker, not the worker
for the organization.
The old concept seized upon by the courts to answer this question
was found in the law of voluntary associations. The judicial attitude
toward the problem is found in an early key-note case where the court
said, "These organizations [labor unions] are formed for purposes
mutually agreed upon; their right to make by-laws and rules for the
admission of members and the transaction of business is unquestion-
able. They may require such qualifications for membership, and such
formalities of elections as they choose. They may restrict membership
* LL.B., 1952, University of Washington.
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to the original promoters, or limit the number to be thereafter admitted.
The very idea of such organizations is association mutually acceptable,
or in accordance with regulations agreed upon. A power to require the
admission of a person in any way objectionable to the society is repug-
nant to the scheme of its organization. While courts have interfered to
inquire into and restrain the action of such societies in the attempted
exclusion of persons who have been regularly admitted to membership,
no case can ... be found where the power of any court has been exer-
cised.., to require the admission of any person to original membership
in any such voluntary association."' Thus the answer given the appli-
cant for union membership in 1890 was the same answer that would
have been given him had he been trying to force his way into a lodge,
fraternity, or private club.2 This approach may have been valid in a
day when the total of organized labor was around 500,000 and unions
were closely integrated, but it seems out of place when union member-
ship runs to over 16,000,000 and that of some locals runs into the
thousands.
The courts refused to interfere in the workings of voluntary associa-
tions for numerous reasons. First, they felt that they lacked jurisdiction
and authority to meddle into these private affairs unless some property
right was involved.3 Second, they did not wish to enunciate decisions
impossible to administer; 4 and, third, they felt that the privacy and
close personal relationships of these small groups should not be dis-
turbed by the possibly inept hand of the court.5 Akin to the factor of
administrative difficulty and likewise important in the reasoning of the
early cases was the supposition that if the court chose to force a mem-
ber upon a union, the union would (as a voluntary association could)
immediately dissolve.6 However, this consideration did not seem to
deter the courts when they believed that some property right was
involved or where the applicant for membership was in reality an ex-
'Mayer v. Journeyman Stonecutter's Association, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 At. 492
(1890).
2 Chaffee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43 HARv. L. REv.
993 (1930) ; Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARv. L. REv. 404 (1916).
3 Kearns v. Hawley, 188 Pa. 116, 41 Atl. 273 (1898) ; American Live-stock Com-
mission Co. v. Chicago Livestock Exchange, 143 Ill. 210, 32 N.E. 274 (1892).
4 Kearns v. Hawley, supra note 3.
5 Frank v. National Alliance of Bill Posters, 89 N.J.L. 380, 381, 99 Atl. 134, 135
(1916). The court said, "It would be quite impractical for the courts to undertake to
compel men to receive into their social relationships one who was personally disagree-
able, whether for a good or bad reason." McKane v. Adams, 123 N.Y. 609, 25 N.E.
1057 (1890).
6 Greenwood v. Building Trades Council of Sacramento, 71 Cal. App. 159, 233 Pac.
823 (1925) ; Simons v. Berry, 210 App. Div. 90, 205 N.Y.S. 442 (1924).
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pelled member seeking re-admission. The possibility of dissolution is
as strong in either instance.' Nevertheless, where no such qualifying
considerations are present the trend of opinion .has been, "Whether to
grant or refuse membership in a voluntary association is a matter under
complete control of the organization itself, and the ruling is not subject
to review by the courts."9
The realization of the inappropriateness of this reasoning has been
expressed judicially ".... it may appear somewhat odd that a person
who apparently is qualified under the rules of the union to become a
member is rejected by the union solely on the ground that the union
does not care to have him as a member."'0 After reaching a holding that
the union could not be compelled to accept an application for member-
ship unless the union so desired, the court said, ". . one might ask
what is to become of the applicant if he is true in his statement of fact
that he will be unable to obtain employment at his chosen vocation
because he is not a member of the union. This is a question involving
public policy and must be answered by the legislature." This is a
strange statement in view of the fact that the courts and not the legis-
latures had made the rule. Of somewhat sterner stuff is this statement
from a neighboring state, "If the characterization of a labor union as a
voluntary association becomes in time a mere anachronism, the mere
word 'voluntary' will not likely preserve the present state of the law."'1
Notice should be taken that a change in surrounding circumstances
such as vast disproportions in the economic strength of competing
parties (as the excluded worker and the excluding union now are) may
make the existing law disjointed and an instrument of oppression if
strictly adhered to. "It is the peculiar genius and strength of the com-
mon law that no decision is stare decisis when it has lost its usefulness
7 "Were the court to decree admission to membership the union being a purely vol-
untary association, could immediately defeat that decree by voluntary dissolution, but
when property rights are involved, the decree of the court cannot be so defeated ...
courts of equity will interefere in the one case, and not in the other. Jurisdiction in the
one instance is founded upon property rights, and protection of the rights of a member;jurisdiction is lacking in the other case for want of such conditions." Greenwood v.
Building Trades Council of Sacramento, supra note 6. Maguire v. Buckley, 301 Mass.
355, 17 N.E. 2d 170 (1938); Spayed v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl.
70 (1921).
" Cason v. Glass Bottle Blower's Assn. 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P. 2d 6 (1951);
Smetherham v. Laundry Workers' Union, 44 Cal. App. 2d 131, 111 P. 2d 948 (1941) ;
Polin v. Kaplan, 247 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931).
9 Simons v. Berry, mipra note 6. See also: Clark v. Curtis, 273 App. Div. 797, 76
N.Y.S. 2d 3 (1947); Walter v. McCarvel, 304 Mass. 260, 34 N.E. 2d 677 (1941);
Shein v. Rose, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 87 (1939) ; Acierno v. North Shore Bus Co., 173 Misc.
79, 17 N.Y.S. 2d 170 (1939).
10 Miller v. Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 394 (1938).
12 Carroll v. Local No. 269, 133 N.. Eq. 144, 31 A. 2d 223 (1943).
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in our social evolution; it is distinguished, and if times have sufficiently
changed, overruled. Judicial opinions should not preserve the social
statics of another generation."' 2 It is apparent that the social factors
have changed and the old reasons behind the rulings have ceased to
exist. Equity courts are finding less trouble in handling complicated
tasks through a master or by placing the burden of vigilance upon the
one likely to be harmed. The idea of the sanctity of the "intimate
group" has been dissipated by the large membership of present day
unions. This same growth removes the heart from the reasoning that it
would be futile for a court to force a member upon a union as the union
could avoid the decree by immediate dissolution. It would be incon-
gruous for one of our contemporary unions to dissolve its complicated
structure and management merely to avoid one unwanted member.
The indispensable spirit of cooperation upon which relations must
ultimately be based was expressed when it was said, "A voluntary union
should be one in which a law-abiding individual of good moral char-
acter, possessing the essential qualification of his trade, can enter upon
compliance with rules and by-laws reasonably appropriate for the sta-
bility and usefulness of the association. Autocracy is no less inimical to
our American ideals if practiced by many rather than one. Since 1890
we have regarded labor unions as voluntary associations. Let them in
reality continue to be such."" This is the new spirit, but the old concept
remains and many of the recent cases continue to follow it in spite of
opposition. 4 The following discussion will endeavor to show the situa-
tion in various components of the problem and the social implications
therein.
THE CLOSED SHOP AND UNION MEMBERSHIP
The problem of admission to union membership becomes acute when
the union has been able to effectuate a closed shop. 5 When the union
12 Ibid.
13 Carroll v. Local 269, supra note 11.
14 Feinne v. Monahan, 196 Misc. 407, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 112 (1949). "Membership in a
labor union is a privilege which the law in this state permits a union to deny, however
worthy the applicant and unfortunate his economic plight because of his exclusion";
Thorn v. Foy, 163 N.E. 2d 417 (Mass. 1952) ; Washington Branch of Amer. Ass'n of
Univ. Women v. Amer. Ass'n of Univ. Women, 79 F. Supp. 88 (1949); Kanzler v.
Linoleum, Carpet, and Soft Tile Workers, 20 Wn. 2d 718, 149 P. 2d 276 (1944) ;
Cameron v. International Alliance, 118 N.J. Eq. 11, 176 Atl. 692 (1935); Newman,
The Closed Union and the Right to Work, 43 Col. L. Rev. 42 (1943).
15 "A closed shop is one in which all employees are required to become and remain
union members as a condition of employment, and in addition, union members only
may be hired, generally through the union. A union shop like the closed shop requires
all existing employees to become and remain union members, but new employees may
be hired from the open market without regard to their union membership." Teller,
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is in a position to control whether or not the worker may work at all,
then the union must accept some limitations upon that power. This has
been realized but the resultant restrictions imposed by federal and state
law on the dosed shop are not similar.
The Taft-Hartley Act has amended the Wagner Act to outlaw the
closed shop where the problem comes under its jurisdiction. This is
the major change in Section 8(a) (3) of the Wagner Act made by the
new law. 0 At present it protects only union shop or maintenance of
membership 17 type contracts and then only if: (1) the union making
the contract is the lawful bargaining agent, and (2) a majority of em-
ployees in the unit authorize the union to make a security agreement
in a secret ballot election. 8 Section 8(b) (2) provides that "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against
an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization
has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure
to tender the periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership."" The outward extent
of Section 8(a) (3) is the authorization of an agreement requiring the
employee to become a member of the contracting labor union "on or
after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or
the effective date of such agreement, whichever is later." A closed shop
agreement, as previously defined," is therefore unauthorized and illegal
under the act, but a union shop agreement is valid. As stated by Mr.
Taft in the Congressional debate on the bill, "Under our provision,...
the closed shop is abolished, and a man can get a job with an employer
and can continue in that job if, in effect, he joins the union and pays the
union dues. In such case there is a fluidity of labor which is very impor-
tant in the United States. Otherwise, the unions would be frozen tight
shut, and apprenticeship could be restricted to such an extent that
thereafter no one could join a union without the consent of the union.
... [Under the bill] a man who is looking for work will be much more
LABOR DisruTs AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1950 Supp.) 92; 31 Am. JuR. 877,
Labor 109.
1a 29 USCA § 141 et seq.
17 A maintainance of membership contract requires only that an employee who is a
member when the contract becomes effective and at the expiration of the escape period,
or who threafter voluntarily joins the union, shall remain a member in good standing.
Colonial Press v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 74 N.E. 2d 1 (1947).
Is The New Labor Law, Bureau of National Affairs, 30 (1947).
19 29 USCA § 158.
20 See note 15, supra.
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able to obtain employment and much less subject to the orders of the
union than he would be if we permitted an absolute closed shop agree-
ment.)2 1
This is not to say that the union could not refuse membership to
anyone, but the teeth would be taken out of such refusal. If the person
refused admittance were an employee of the company with which the
union was dealing, the union could not demand that the company fire
him. So long as an employee is willing to enter the union and pay the
same dues as other members, he could not be fired from his job because
the union refused to take him."
The National Labor Relations Act does not preclude a state from
prohibiting closed shop contracts in whole or in part. The law of the
state where the closed shop contract was made must be examined to
determine its validity.
2 3
A state court with much experience in the field has said, "If the union
can force a closed shop upon all, or almost all, of the employers of an
industry or area, the right to employment will depend upon union mem-
bership; and if union membership be refused the workman, he is more
totally excluded from the opportunity to labor than he was before union
recognition."2 " In one instance the complainant was denied membership
in a union which had entered into a closed shop contract with substan-
tially all the employers in the industry. The only ground alleged by the
union for denying membership was that "the books of the union were
closed to new membership because many members in good standing
were unemployed." The union had notified the, employer that he was
breaking his contract with the union by continuing the complainant in
his employ. The court granted the worker's request for a mandatory
injunction upon the ground that the closed shop contract was against
public policy, because it involved a union which, though seeking virtu-
ally to bind an entire industry to the terms and conditions of a closed
shop contract, excluded qualified men in the trade from its ranks."
When a valid closed shop contract is accomplished, such does not jus-
tify the employer in discharging, nor the union in insisting on the dis-
21 The New Labor Law, supra, note 18, Pg. E (3) -9.
22 Union Starch and Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 F. 2d 1008 (1951) ; cert. denied.
342 U.S. 815, 96 L. Ed. 28 (1951).
23 Colgate Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355, 94 L. Ed. 161 (1949).
2 Carroll v. Local 269, supra, note 11; Wilson v. Newspaper, etc. Union, 123 N.J.
Eq. 347, 197 At. 720 (1938) ; Harris v. Geier, 112 N.J. Eq. 99, 164 AtI. 50 (1932);
42 YALE L. J. 1244 (1933).
25 Wilson v. Newspaper Union, supra, note 24. Canter Sample Furniture House,
Inc. v. Retail Furniture Employees Local No. 109, 122 N.J. Eq. 575, 196 Atl. 210
(1937) ; Shinsky v. O'Neil, 233 Mass. 99, 121 N.E. 790 (1919).
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charge of, an employee whom the union refuses to admit to member-
ship.26 The philosophy has been that unions, in this situation, must
accept a limitation on such possibly autocratic power."
The curtailment of the employer's freedom of choice has also been
a consideration of some import in these cases. The Supreme Court of
Oregon has said, "Labor unions which close their ranks to the public
thereby assume a sovereignty which is not theirs to assume. The whole
field of available workers should likewise be made available to the
employer for choice with respect to skill and the many personality
factors. The closed shop as an instrumentality of a labor union, mem-
bership wherein is reasonably open to the public, establishes a desir-
able rule governing industrial enterprise. The closed shop at the hands
of a labor union which substantially excludes the public from its bene-
fits, on the other hand, is a means whereby an antisocial monopoly is
foisted upon the industrial body politic."2
Many states have followed the lead of the Taft-Hartley Act and
have declared closed shop agreements unlawful either by statute or
within constitutional amendments.29 Washington has no statute com-
parable to the federal provisions on the closed shop and a recent deci-
sion has expressly recognized the validity of the closed shop contract
where the case is exclusively within state jurisdiction. In that case an
employer-member of the union had employed a non-union driver who
applied for membership but who was rejected because the union had
100 unemployed members. The court said, inter alia, "The by-laws
constituted a closed shop agreement effective while appellant was a
member of the union. It was an agreement entered into by appellant
at a time when he employed only union members. Contracts of this kind
are commonpiace and not unlawful under the laws of this state. Al-
though the laborer was eligible for membership under the union con-
stitution, it did not entitle him to membership as a matter of right.""0
The vice of the closed shop is that it leaves the excluded person with-
out recourse. If such contracts are to be accorded validity, the worker's
position must be recognized and in some way protected.
20 Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 141 F. 2d 87 (C.C.A. 4th 1944) ; Dorrington v. Man-
ning, 135 Pa. Super. Ct. 194, 4 A. 2d 886 (1939).
27 See: American Communications Association, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 94 L.
Ed. 925 (1949).
28 Schwab v. Motion Picture Machine Operators, 165 Or. 602, 109 P. 2d 600
(1941); Teller, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 285, § 99 (1940).
29 Mueller, LABOR LAW AND LEGISLATION, 785 (1949).
so Yeager v. International Brotherhood, 139 Wash. Dec. 747, 239 P. 2d 318 (1951).
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EXCLUSIONS ON GROUNDS OF RACE, RELIGION, SEX OR NATIONALITY
Exclusion from a labor union because of religion, sex or nationality
is not widespread, but where it happens the consequences to the indi-
vidual are, of course, severe. Religious discrimination is usually prac-
ticed in a "sub rosa" manner and is probably negligible.3' Restrictions
on female membership have decreased. 2 Citizenship barriers are more
frequently encountered, twenty-nine unions having had constitutional
restrictions in 1946. 8" The most chronic and serious of restrictions is
exclusion because of race. While only a minority of unions excludes on
account of racial grounds, the minority is large, encompassing almost
two million members and including unions within the powerful railroad
brotherhoods. 4
It has often been said that the right to earn a livelihood is a property
right which is guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution. " In a case where negroes had been relegated to an
auxiliary union, and were being indirectly discriminated against, the
court said, the union enjoying a closed shop ". . . may no longer
claim the same freedom from restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or fra-
ternal organizations. Its asserted right to choose its own members does
not merely relate to social relations, it affects the fundamental right to
work for a living." 6 The theory supporting a constitutional right to
membership is that the exclusionary acts of a union operating under
powers given by a state are "state action" within the Fourteenth
Amendment, 7 or that the union is functioning as an arm of the federal
government under the National Labor Relations Act and therefore its
action is limited by the Fifth Amendment. "8 It has been held that the
bargaining representative, in exercising statutory bargaining power,
was acting as an agency of the federal government and was thus with-
held by the Fifth Amendment from denying a minority the right to
participate. The court enjoined the union from continuing to act as
bargaining representative so long as it continued to discriminate against
negroes by placing them in an auxiliary union. It was said, "The denial
31 Summers, Admission Policies of Labor Unions, 61 Q. J. ECON. 66 (1946).
32 9 LAB. RESEARCH Assoc., LABOR FAcr BooK, 118 (1949). In 1937 less than 10
percent of organized labor were women while now 20 percent are.
s3 Summers, supra, note 31, p. 73.
34 Murray, THE NEGRO HANDBOOK, p. 162 (1949).
35 Carroll v. Local 269 etc., supra, note 11.
36 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900 (1944).
37 See, American Communication Association v. Douds, supra, note 27; U. S.
CONST. AMEND. I.
38 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V.
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to a workman, because of race, of an equal voice in determining issues
*.. is an infringement of liberty if indeed it may not also be said to be
a deprival of property rights." 9
In that case, however, the petitioner was already a member of the
union and was not seeking initial admission. Recently in a situation
where the plaintiff was asking for admission, the union had a monopoly
on employment in plaintiff's specialty, and had admitted none to this
specialty for six years. It was held that where members of the group
which the union represents are discriminated against, the federal
courts will take jurisdiction. The court continued saying, "There is,
however, no authority for the idea that the union has any corresponding
duty to persons not employed but who are employable.
40
The Taft-Hartley Act says that an employer is not justified in dis-
criminating against an employee, even under the terms of a valid union
shop contract, if he has reason to believe that membership in the union
was not available to the employee on the same terms as those applicable
to other members." The Act forbids unions to discriminate against an
employee with respect to whom membership has been denied or termi-
nated on some ground other than his failure to tender dues and initia-
tion fees. 2 The courts have given this clause a literal interpretation so
far and refused to allow a union to exclude an employee because of fail-
ure to comply with any other requirement.4
The Washington legislature, in 1890, passed a statute allowing
women to pursue any calling open to men and stating that no person
shall be disqualified from any employment on account of sex.44 In 1943,
the legislature also provided that women must receive equal pay with
men for equal work and also gave any woman discriminated against
because of her sex a civil action for the recovery of the differential in
her wages from that which a man in a like position was receiving."
The "Law Against Discrimination in Employment" was passed in
1949 and expressly declares employment to be a civil right. It states,
"The opportunity to obtain employment without discrimination be-
39 Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 458, 169 P. 2d 831, 166 A.L.R. 342 (1946).
40 Courant v. International Photographers, 176 F. 2d 1000 (C.C.A. 9th 1949), cert.
denied 338 U.S. 943, 94 L. Ed. 581 (1950) ; Steele v. Louisville and M. P. Co., 323
U.S. 192, 89 L. Ed. 173 (1944) ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210, 89 L. Ed. 187(1944).4
'NATroNAL LABoa RELATIOmS ACT, 1947, § 8 (a) (3).
4 2 NATioNAL LAnoR RELATiONS AcT, 1947, § 8 (b) (2).
-i See note 22, supra.
44 RCW 49.12.200 [RRS § 7620].
J5 RCW 49.12210 [Rma. Su p. 1943 § 7636-1].
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cause of race, creed, color or national origin is ... a civil right."4 The
statute also declares it to be an unfair employment practice for any
labor union:
1. To deny full membership rights and privileges to any person because
of such person's race, creed, color or national origin.
2. To expel from membership any person because of such.
3. To discriminate against any member, employer, or employee because
of such.4'
There is no definitive case material on this statute as yet, and what
its effect on local conditions will be is mainly conjectural. The com-
parative absence of any racial antagonism in the Northwest plus the
enlightened spirit of the legislation should minimize any problem in
this state.
THE EcoNoMIc MOTIVE IN EXCLUSION FROM THE UNION
MEMBERSHIP
The right of the individual to work and make a living as he pleases
may, and often does, come into direct conflict with the right and interest
of the union in maintaining its security. It is a question of which inter-
est must be primary, that of the group or the individual. It has been
said, "While the union emphasizes the right of self-organization, with
all its pendant privileges and claims accruing to the union, including
union security, it rejects the individual's right to work, which is even
more basic, proceeding from the United States Constitution itself. This
is a primary right, more essential than any other except the right to life,
which are both part and parcel with the right to liberty."48
This is the philosophy and spirit that pervades the articles on the
problem,49 but the courts themselves have either rejected the philosophy
or have as yet failed to recognize the full aspects of the problem. If the
nation is again faced with numbers of unemployed, the problem will
become acute. It is hoped an answer will be found before such stresses
develop to cloud calm deliberation.
The remainder of this paper, therefore, will be devoted to the meth-
ods, and their effects, by which the unions have excluded unwanted
46 RCW 49.60.030; Helsell, The Law Against Discrimination in Employment, 25
WASTI. L. REv. 225 (1950).
47 RCW 49.60.190 [REm. Supp. 1949 § 7614-26].
48 Rose, The Right to Work: It Must Be Supreme Over Union Security, 35
A.B.A.J. 110 (1949).
49 Summers, Union Powers and Workers Rights, 49 MIcH. L. RE V. 805 (1949);
Rose, The Right to Work: It Must Be Supreme Over Union Security, note 48 ibid.;
Newman, The Closed Union and the Right to Work, supra, note 14.
UNION MEMBERSHIP
members and such remedies as are available against such action. It
should be noted that most of the methods used strike either directly
or indirectly at the pocketbook of the petitioning outsider.
Apprenticeships
One method of exclusion which has been used is to require an appli-
cant for membership first to complete a long and tedious period of
apprenticeship. These learning periods have been extended at times for
so long a period that the worker realizes that he would be better off
elsewhere than continuing on in the hope that he will be admitted to
full membership at some time. Under most apprenticeship arrange-
ments there is a lower wage scale for the apprentice"0 and therefore the
power of the union to exclude the worker by making "the game not
worth the candle" increases directly as the wage is lower or the appren-
ticeship period longer. Thus, the apprenticeship requirement may be
used to effectuate a closed shop by relegating all new applicants to an
apprentice status and keeping them there indefinitely."
The use of the apprenticeship requirement as an exclusionary device
has not received much opposition from the courts. In one case where
the apprentice had completed his four years of apprenticeship service
and had failed to comply with a technicality of admission which he was
presumably now willing to perform, the court refused to grant him
relief on the old ground that a union may impose the same requirements
as a voluntary association and the courts will not interfere.5"
The state of Washington has a body of statutory law regarding
apprenticeships but there is no provision therein for the maximum
length of apprenticeships or the worker's right to full membership
upon completion of the learning period. 3 The emphasis of the statute
is on standards required of an apprentice and not on any protection
of his rights. It would seem to be desirable to have statutory limits
set forth to curb possible arbitrary exclusion by a union and to inform
the worker that his goal of full union membership will not be denied
him after he has completed a reasonable training period.
Admission Tests And Licensing Provisions
In some unions, the applicant is required to pass an admission test.
This requirement gives the union or its examining board the power
50 For a coverage of union contract clauses relating to apprentices and learners see:
5 CCH LAB. LAwi RP. ff 51,750 et seq.
52 Summers, The Right to Joh; a Union, 47 CoL. L. REv. 33, 35 (1947).
52 Muller v. Bricklayers', etc., Union, 6 N.J. Misc. 226, 140 Atl. 424 (1928).
5. RCW 49.04.010 et seq. [REm. Surr. § 7614-5].
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to exclude whom they wish either by making the test too difficult to
pass or by arbitrarily refusing to recognize a passing grade.5" The use
of the state or municipal license as an exclusionary device has been
increasing. Under this system, union pressure is brought to gain the
passage of a statute or ordinance requiring all workers in a certain
field to have a license to perform the work. If such an enactment is in
force the union may exert its pressure to make the license practically
impossible to achieve except by its members. Licenses should be re-
quired only of those who work in a field directly connected with the
health and safety of the public. Freedom of activity should be the
deciding factor rather than a misplaced and unwarranted solicitude
for public safety when a license is proposed as a requirement before
one may work in a trade.
Work Permits
The work permit system is an arrangement whereby unions, for a
fee, give permission to non-members to work in an enterprise in which
hiring or continuation of employment is controlled by the union.55 The
work permit, therefore, is an outgrowth of the closed shop. The pro-
visions of the Taft-Hartley Act outlawed the closed shop,"8 but it has
persisted to some extent in spite of the act and so has the use of work
permits. Instances have been found of its present use by a few unions
in Seattle."
The worker is given adequate remedy against the work permit by
the Taft-Hartley Act if he will use it. He may either file charges with
the National Labor Relations Board and get an order requiring resti-
tution of the permit fee, if it has been paid and work commenced
under it, or he may recover back pay from the union if he had refused
to pay for the permit and had been denied employment as a con-
sequence.5
Even before the Taft-Hartley Act's denunciation of the work
permit, its use had fallen into disrepute. Some local unions had used
it as a method of extortion thereby giving the whole system a bad
reputation. The work permit has its valid uses as it provides a way
of allowing the non-union worker to work on a seasonal job without
admitting him to the union and it can be used as a device to rotate the
54 Summers, The Right to Join a Union, supra, note 51, at p. 35.
55 Lahne, The Union Work Permit, 66 POL. Sca. Q. 366 (1951).
56 Supra, note 18.
57 Information obtained by interview.58 THE NEW LABOR LAW, BUREAU op NATIONAL AFFAIRS, 32 (1947).
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available work among numerous applicants. In general, however, it
may be said that its use will probably diminish. This is because it has
uniformly been denounced by the internationals on the grounds that:
1. The system is in violation of union principles.
2. It fosters dual organization. 9
3. It creates a source of non-union labor which is then available to
non-union employers and thereby endangers control of the labor
supply.
4. It undermines the apprenticeship system and is thus unfair to
the locals that abide by the apprenticeship rules.
5. It may provide a ready source of strikebreakers if the occasion
arises."
Thus two effective remedies against the work permit, which are also
inexpensive, are by exerting pressure on the international to have it
police its locals and by use of the Taft-Hartley Act sanctions through
the National Labor Relations Board.
Initiation Fees
The use of high initiation fees as an exclusionary device was intro-
duced when the old craft unions desired to limit their available mem-
bership to what they believed was the available employment. While
the percentage of applicants excluded at the present time by a pro-
hibitive initiation fee is small, those unions which do practice this
exclusionary method are often those which control the higher paying
and more desirable jobs.6
The Taft-Hartley Act has made it an unfair labor practice for a
union to charge "excessive" or "discriminatory" fees as a condition of
membership.6" The employer may hire a prospective employee who
has tendered the standard initiation fees to the union and, moreover,
he will be held to have discriminated against the employee if he dis-
charges him for lack of membership, if the employee has so tendered
the fees.Y
59 When the permit holders come to realize they approach the numerical strength
of the local and are still excluded, they often form their own competing local.
60 Lahne, The Union Work Permit, supra, note 55.
6 1 Taft, Dues and Initiation Fees in Labor Unions, 60 Q. J. Ecow. 219 (1946);
Summers, The Right to Join a Union, supra, note 51 at p. 35.
62 THE NEw LABOR LAW, BuREAu OF NAT'L AFFAIRs, at p. 35; NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS Acr, 1947, § 8 (b) (2) ; 2 CCH LAB. LAW REP. 1f 4130.6 3 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1947, § 8 (a) (3) (b).
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What is a "discriminatory" or "excessive" initiation fee is not a
fixed sum. Under the new law, the National Labor Relations Board is
to consider, among other relevant factors, the practices and customs
of labor organizations in the particular industry, and the wages cur-
rently paid to the employees affected. 4
The charging of excessive initiation fees, by itself, is not made an
unfair labor practice under the act. It is unfair only where the ex-
cessive fees are charged in furtherance of a union security clause
which makes union membership a condition of employment. 5
The essence of the situation has thus been expressed, "The section
[referring to Section 8 (b) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act
1947] is prompted . . . by practices encountered during recent years
when some of the unions, unable to supply established members in
sufficient number to meet the employment demand, capitalized their
closed shop contracts by what practically amounted to selling jobs at
high prices, disguised, in the form of excessive 'initiation' fees and
work permits ... the field of organized labor is so varied, that there
is no fixed yardstick by which the reasonableness of its initiation fees
and dues can be measured without an intimate knowledge of the in-
dustry, of the place the union occupies in it, and of the value to the
member of his affiliation with it."6
Thus it will be necessary to analyze each situation separately as it
arises in order to determine whether initiation fees are discriminatory
within the act.
Auxiliary Unions
Many unions have used the auxiliary union to exclude potential
members. The auxiliary union is, in effect, a mere dumping ground for
unwanted members and a fraud on those within it. The member of
such an auxiliary union has no right beyond that of paying his fees
and dues and of working when the corresponding main local allows
him to do so. The member of the auxiliary usually has no voting rights,
no delegates in the main organizations, and no business agent save
that service given them by the main local.
This device has been used to exclude mainly because of race. In a
64 NATIONAL LABOR RELATION S AcT, 1947, § 8 (b) (5); Teller, Labor Disputes
and Collective Bargaining, supra, note 15, at § 398.71.
65 Teller, ibid., § 398.71 at p. 103; Rothenberg, LABOR RELATIONS, § 455; 2 CCH
LABOR LAW REP. II 4140.
66 NLRB Release R-4, Sept. 23, 1947.
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well known landmark case, it was held that where negroes were forced
to enter a so-called auxiliary union that such act was invalid. The
court held that they must either be allowed full membership or be
allowed to work without joining the union at all."7 Some unions have
resorted to using a segregated local, granting to it rights nearly identical
with those of the white local, but withholding some essential right,
such as the right of the local to have its own business agent. If the
segregated local is, however, in fact, given equal rights and privileges,
the National Labor Relations Board will not withhold certification of
the *hite local. The situation is analagous to the "separate but equal"
requirement in regard to negro-white schooling.-"
Thus it has been held that the National Labor Relations Board will
grant recognition to a segregated local in which the members have
equal rights, but will withhold recognition as collective bargaining
agent when the segregated local is not really granted equal rights or is
treated as an auxiliary.89
Remedies
It is the established rule that the courts will not take jurisdiction
over a dispute between a union and one of its members until the mem-
ber has exhausted his internal remedies.70 This rule will not be en-
forced where the pursuit of the internal remedies would be futile,
illusory, and vain.7 Thus where either final settlement cannot be had
till the dispute has gone through a maze of appeal boards or the ex-
haustion of the internal remedies will take so long as to first exhaust
the appellant, direct resort may be had to the civil courts." In a
succession of cases the Washington court has held it unnecessary to
exhaust internal remedies where the dispute concerns money or tangible
property rather than internal discipline. Where money matters are
involved the right to direct resort to the courts can be waived only by
67 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329 (1944) ; See also, Betts
v. Easley, supra, note 39; Cameron v. International Alliance, 118 N.. Eq. 11, 176 AtI.
692, 97 A.L.R. 594 (1935).
68 See: Atlanta Oak Flooring, 62 NLRB 973 (1945); Bethlehem-Aameda Ship-
yards, Inc. 53 NLRB 999 (1943).
69 31 Am. Jun., LAmOR § 65.
7 0 Porth v. Local Union 201, 171 Kan. 177, 231 P. 2d 252 (1951) ; Constantino v.
Moreschi, 9 Wn. 2d 638, 115 P. 2d 955 (1941).
71 Walsche v. Sherlock, 110 NJ. Eq. 223, 159 At. 661 (1932),7 2 Wash. Local Etc. v. Internat'l Etc., 33 Wn. 2d 1, 203 P. 2d 1019 (1949) ; Furni-
ture Workers Union v. United, Etc., 6 Wn. 2d 654, 108 P. 2d 651 (1940); Local-
Lodge No. 104 v. I.B.B.M. Etc., 158 Wash. 480, 291 Pac. 328 (1930).
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an express agreement to submit such controversies to some specified
method of arbitration.
73
The proceedings within the organization must be conducted in
compliance with the requirements of the organization itself, 74 and
where valuable rights are involved the member who is to be disciplined
must be given notice of the charges and a hearing, whether or not
provision is made therefor in the rules of the organization. 3
As may be seen from a knowledge of the various exclusionary prac-
tices, the rules governing internal remedies would concern the worker
only if he is at least a pseudo-member of the union. Court regulation
of these remedies affords no protection for the worker who is not a
member at all. The worker who has been denied membership because
of refusal to pay an exhorbitant initiation fee, a worker who fails an
unfair competency test, a worker who refuses to work on a work
permit, or one denied admission after completion of an apprenticeship
should not be barred from the courts because of this rule, but should
be treated for the purposes of the dispute as if he were a member.
Under the Taft-Hartley Act the worker has the opportunity to file
charges under the National Labor Relations Act if the union engages in
any unfair labor practice as specified." This remedy is most effective
for the worker since the heavy and usually prohibitive cost of prosecu-
tion is carried by the Board and is not placed upon the worker, who
in this situation is often without a job. The governmental weapons of
injunction against the unfair labor practice, or of withdrawal of recog-
nition of the offending union's collective bargaining agent often carry
enough threat within them to gain union compliance without their use.
A practical, but non-legal approach is to bring the discriminatory
practice to the attention of the international. This should be more
effective now than in the past since all parties to the labor problem
are beginning to realize there is no final or truly beneficial answer to
any of them until all factors are recognized and all sides satisfied with
the results. This thinking can be expected more from the internationals
than the locals, since the international is more removed from the hue
73 Wash. Local Etc. v. Internat'l Etc., 28 Wn. 2d 536, 183 P. 2d 504 (1947) ; Leo
v. Local Union Etc., 26 Wn. 2d 498, 174 P. 2d 523 (1946) ; Local Lodge No. 104 v.
I.B.B.M. Etc., 158 Wash. 480, 291 Pac. 328 (1930).
74 Cox v. United Brotherhood, 190 Wash. 511, 69 P. 2d 148 (1937); Johnson v.
Internat'l of the United Brotherhood, 52 Nev. 400, 288 Pac. 170 (1930).
75 Wash. Local Etc. v. Internat'l Etc.; Furniture Workers Union v. United, Etc.,
supra, note 72; Ray v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44 P. 2d
787 (1935).
76 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1947, § 10.
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and cry of the economic struggle; it has a better perspective on the
public attitude, and thus is more able to see the forest and not the
trees.
CONCLUSIONS
A historical view of the developments in this field during the past
decades will reveal that though the courts have often denied redress
to the excluded worker, remedies are developing elsewhere because of
the basic inequities of the situation. It is an apt illustration of the fact
that if the law does not keep up with changing conditions, social
pressures will inevitably find relief through a different vent.
The worker should be allowed to join the union if he is willing to
abide by reasonable entrance requirements. Only in this way can he
be given a chance to protect himself by the exercise of his vote and a
voicing of his opinions. The union, on the other hand, can still provide
work and protect itself during periods of recession by use of the
seniority system. This would protect the man with long service and
yet inform the newcomer that if work is available, he will not be
shunted aside.
Technicalities should be avoided and a workable result should be
the goal. If the lawyer and the law are to be of service to the labor
field, adaptability must be the byword.
